Philosophy

This paper argues that a vision of apocalypse as metamorphosis developed by the early German Romantic Karoline von Günderrode redresses gendered assumptions in the Kantian sublime and, in so doing, suggests a different model of agency to Kant. I argue that Günderrode uses a notion of metamorphosis to avoid on the one hand overemphasis on consciousness and agency and on the other accepting determinism and self-annihilation. After briefly outlining problems with the Kantian sublime, I use the works “Once I Lived Sweet Life” and “An Apocalyptic Fragment” to show how Günderrode reconfigures the relationships of the individual to things greater than her and beyond her power, including nature and time, to give an alternative to the Kantian sublime. This model has implications for freedom and agency that contrast with the form of agency found in Kant, and I use Günderrode’s play “Hildgund” to show how this emerges in her work.

Nietzsche maintains, famously, that suffering can be made part of something beautiful and inspiring. This paper is concerned with particular kinds of suffering that emerge in encounters with others. I argue that, even when one takes into account Nietzsche’s recognition of the individual’s situation in society as an enabling condition for her activity, his acknowledgement of the possibility of empathy does not indicate a value for such intersubjective experience. Rather, it is an instance of a tension Nietzsche identifies between our inescapable implication in social ways of being and our need to create ourselves independently in order to overcome self-alienation.

Bilingual English-German edition of second collection published by the German poet, dramatist, and philosopher Karoline von Günderrode (1780–1806).

The second collection of writings by the German poet, dramatist, and philosopher Karoline von Günderrode (1780–1806), Poetic Fragments was published in 1805 under the pseudonym “Tian.” Günderrode’s work is an unmined source of insight into German Romanticism and Idealism, as well as into the reception of Indian, Persian, and Islamic thought in Europe. Anna C. Ezekiel’s introductions highlight the philosophical significance of the texts, demonstrating their radical and original consideration of the nature of the universe, death, religion, power, and gender roles. The dramas “Hildgund” and “Muhammad, the Prophet of Mecca” are two of Günderrode’s most important works for her accounts of agency, recognition, and the status of women. The three poems included in the collection, “Piedro,” “The Pilgrims,” and “The Kiss in the Dream,” represent the wide range of forms in which Günderrode wrote. They reflect themes of erotic longing and union with the divine, and point to her radical reimagining of death. This bilingual English-German edition is the first volume of Günderrode’s work to appear in English, and will help unearth this rich, complex, and innovative writer for English readers.

Considerable progress in personality and social psychology has been largely ignored by philosophers, many of whom still remain sceptical concerning whether the conception of character presupposed by virtue theory is descriptively adequate. Here, I employ the five-factor model of personality, currently the consensus view in personality psychology, to respond to a strong reading of the situationist challenge, whereby most people lack dispositions that are both cross-situationally consistent and temporally stable. I show that situationists rely on a false dichotomy between character traits and situations, and that evidence supports the empirical adequacy of the sorts of character traits presupposed by virtue ethics. Additionally, I suggest that the personality traits of the five-factor model are relevant to virtue theory, insofar as they are malleable, morally salient, and seem to structurally parallel Aristotelian virtues and vices. Thus, contra situationism, the five-factor model supports the descriptive adequacy of a virtue-theoretical framework.

An unproofed version of my manuscript is available on my website: http://www.panosparis.com/research

Ugliness is a neglected topic in contemporary analytic aesthetics. This is regrettable given that this topic is not just genuinely fascinating, but could also illuminate other areas in the field, seeing as ugliness, albeit unexplored, does feature rather prominently in several debates in aesthetics. This paper articulates a ‘deformity-related’ conception of ugliness. Ultimately, I argue that deformity, understood in a certain way, and displeasure, jointly suffice for ugliness. First, I motivate my proposal, by locating a ‘deformity-related’ conception of ugliness in aesthetic tradition, offering examples in support, and rejecting related alternative suggestions. Second, I argue that the proposal boasts considerable merits. Not only does it capture much of what we ordinarily think of as ugly, but it also comprises an objective criterion for ugliness, offers unity and comprehensiveness, and is informative and explanatorily potent. Third, I discuss a number of objections, thereby demonstrating that the proposal withstands reflective scrutiny.

Although formative of modern value theory, the moral beauty view—which states that moral virtue is beautiful and moral vice is ugly—is now mostly neglected by (analytic) philosophers. The two contemporary defences of the view mostly capitalize on its intuitive attractiveness, but to little avail: such considerations hardly convince sceptics of what is nowadays a rather unpopular view. Historically, the view was supported by thought experiments; and although these greatly increase its plausibility, they also raise empirical questions, which they leave unanswered. Here, I offer a novel defence of the moral beauty view, capitalizing on empirical evidence and arguing via an inference to the best explanation.

There is a tendency in contemporary (analytic) aesthetics to restrict the scope of things that can be beautiful or ugly, often claiming that many of the things that people ordinarily find beautiful or ugly are not the sorts of things that can be beautiful or ugly. I think that this peculiarly modern tendency is holding back progress in aesthetics, and robbing it of its potential contribution to other domains of enquiry. One view that has suffered neglect as a result of this tendency is the moral beauty view, whereby if a trait is a moral virtue, then it is a beautiful character trait and, conversely, if a trait is a moral vice, then it is an ugly character trait. Neglect of this view stems from an assumption to the effect that virtues and vices simply cannot beautiful or ugly. My aim in this paper is twofold. First, I develop an account of form, under which, I argue, possession of form suffices for an object's candidature for beauty and ugliness. Second, I argue that, under the foregoing proposal, the moral beauty view turns out to be a coherent position, and so should be taken seriously in both aesthetics and ethics.

According to immoralists, some artworks are better aesthetically in virtue of their immorality. A. W. Eaton recently offered a novel defence of this view, seeking to overcome shortcomings in previous accounts, thereby occasioning a reconsideration of immoralism. Yet, as I argue in this paper, Eaton’s attempt is unsuccessful, insofar as it consists partly of inadequately supported claims, and partly— and more interestingly, albeit paradoxically––of covert moralist assumptions that are, eo ipso, incompatible with immoralism. I then turn to a parallel debate in ethics concerning the possibility of admirable immorality, suggesting that a consideration of the state of that debate further supports my argument against immoralism. I close by suggesting some strategies by which immoralists may offer a rejoinder, although I note that their prospects are rather dim, not least because available defences of immoralism and similar positions all seem to share the same flawed pattern.

This article seeks to rekindle a version of the age-old view that aesthetic education can contribute to the development of virtue. It proceeds as follows. First, it introduces the moral beauty view, whereby the moral virtues are beautiful, and the moral vices ugly, character traits. Second, two ways in which moral beauty and ugliness can manifest themselves are considered: in people and in artworks. Third, it is argued that character education couched partly in aesthetic terms, and coupled with the cultivation of a sensitivity to moral beauty and ugliness, promise a solid and motivationally robust anchor for moral character development. It is suggested that introducing the notions of moral beauty and ugliness in our conceptual repertoire, coupled with the presence of moral beauty in our surroundings, can undergird more traditional pathways to virtue, whilst being congenial to the maintenance of virtue. Before closing, three objections against these suggestions are addressed, and some avenues for exploring the notion of moral beauty vis-à-vis moral motivation and education are proposed.

I offer a set of sufficient conditions for (a kind of) beauty, drawing on Parsons and Carlson’s account of ‘functional beauty’. First, I argue that their account is flawed, whilst falling short of its promise of bringing comprehensiveness and unity to aesthetics. Instead, I propose, the account should be modified to state that if an object is well-formed for its function(s) and pleases competent judges in so far as it is thus experienced, then it is (functionally) beautiful. I argue that my proposal offers greater informativeness, comprehensiveness, and unity—accommodating, inter alia, mathematical, literary, and moral beauty—whilst surviving reflective scrutiny.

Is social justice possible within capitalist societies? Or should progressives and egalitarians be looking for viable alternatives to free-market capitalism? John Rawls, one of the most influential political philosophers of the last century, advanced the view that social justice is indeed impossible within the constraints of the capitalist welfare state. Rawls believed that familiar capitalist societies in which a small minority holds a massively disproportionate share of wealth could not possibly be just. Instead, he argued that justice requires a different form of socioeconomic organization, one in which human and nonhuman capital is dispersed widely. He called it a "property-owning democracy".

Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond presents the first extended treatment of Rawls' important ideas about the practical implementation of his theory of justice. Contributors to this volume approach Rawls' idea from a number of perspectives: its philosophical foundations, institutional implications, and possible connections to the future of left-of-center politics. Readings shed new light on a variety of topics, including the inequality of current wealth distribution in advanced capitalist societies; ways of funding a system of universal asset holdings; novel democratic forms of ownership; the link between asset ownership and human capital; and many others. Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond offers thought-provoking insights into the concept of social justice in the 21st-century world.